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Colombia1. Introduction
The conservation of common pool resources (CPRs) such as forests,
pastures or ﬁsheries, depends on several factors such as the type and
the size of the resource, the characteristics of the resource users or the
institutions (rules) that govern these resources (Agrawal, 2001;
Baland and Platteau, 1996; Basurto et al., 2013; Basurto and Ostrom,
2009; Ostrom, 1990). There is plenty of empirical evidence that subjects
do not always follow the theoretical assumption of self-interest
(Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965), and instead, they cooperate voluntarily
to achieve a successful exploitation of the resources. Higher cooperation
leads to more sustainable resource use (Basurto et al., 2013; Orensanz
et al., 2013; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999; Ostrom et al., 1992;
Schlager, 1994).
Besides the ability to engage in cooperation, the level of patience or
impatience of actors, in our case ﬁshermen, is another important factor
that can affect sustainability. Thus, according to standard economic the-
ory on ﬁsheries (Clark, 1973; Sumaila andWalters, 2005) when ﬁsher-
men are impatient (i.e., they have high discount rates) and prefer to
receive a smaller beneﬁt immediately rather than to wait for a larger
beneﬁt in the futurewhich is less certain, it ismore likely that they over-
exploit ﬁshery resources and behave therefore unsustainably. Onlyarine Ecology Fahrenheitstr. 6,
hlüter).
. This is an open access article undersome authors argue in favor of a disinvestment hypothesis that states
myopic resource users might not have the means to invest in resource
technology and therefore, behave more sustainably (Farzin, 1984).
In the last decades, laboratory experiments in economics have been an
important tool to study human behavior and cooperation among subjects
in different settings (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Levitt and List, 2007). In
particular, economic ﬁeld experiments with users who share a real natu-
ral resource have increased our knowledge regarding how theymake de-
cisions and self-organize to extract those resources in a sustainable way
(Cárdenas, 2000, 2011; Cárdenas and Carpenter, 2008; Cárdenas and
Ostrom, 2004; Janssen and Anderies, 2011; Muradian and Cárdenas,
2015; Ostrom, 2006), thus avoiding the circumstance of being trapped
in the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968).
In ﬁsheries, scholars have used economic ﬁeld experiments to ex-
plore different factors such as communication, impatience, reciprocity,
rules, and regulations affecting the likelihood of successful cooperation
in the management of CPRs (Aswani et al., 2013; Castillo et al., 2011;
Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Lopez et al., 2012; Teh et al., 2011; Vélez
and Lopez, 2013; Vélez et al., 2009, 2012).
Results from economic experiments are often used for policy recom-
mendations. However, unless a clear link is established we cannot draw
conclusions for resource governance in real life (Levitt and List, 2007;
Ostrom, 2006). Nevertheless, there are only a few studies about the ex-
ternal validity of experiments on cooperation in commons resource
management. To our knowledge, up to date, there are only six studies:
four of them found evidence of external validity (Carpenter and Seki,(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).the CC BY license
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2010) and the other two studies did not (Gurven and Winking, 2008;
Hill and Gurven, 2004).
In order to contribute to the experimental analysis of cooperation in
artisanal ﬁsheries and the debate on the external validity of economic
experiments, we did a similar study to that of Fehr and Leibbrandt
(2011). These authors examined the role of cooperativeness and impa-
tience on the sustainable exploitation of a CPR with open access by
combining laboratory experiments with ﬁeld data. They found that
shrimpers who were more patient and cooperated more intensively in
the experiment also used more sustainable ﬁshing instruments. Moti-
vated by these ﬁndings and taking into account that cooperation and
impatience are important factors for resource conservation, we investi-
gate the degree towhich experimentalmeasures of cooperation and im-
patience are correlated to real life sustainable behavior. In case a clear
correlation could be found, then those experiments could be used for
thequick assessment of the sustainability or at least collective action po-
tential of the community (Aswani et al., 2013). It also could be used as a
robust tool for testing different policy alternatives (Cárdenas, 2004).
However, it could also be that the link between cooperation and time
preferences on the one hand and sustainable behavior on the other
hand is not as straightforward. Then those experiments would have to
be used with a lot more care, when linking them directly to sustainable
behavior.
The study was carried out in Tasajera, a small ﬁshing community lo-
cated in the Caribbean coast of Colombia, which depends mainly on
ﬁshery resources from Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta (CGSM) for
their livelihood. For measuring the ecological impact of ﬁshermen on
the CGSM, we gained access to primary information on real ﬁshing be-
havior over various years collected by a beach recorder of the Institute
for Marine and Coastal Research (INVEMAR).1 These data, together
with an evaluation on the ecological impact of ﬁshing activities in the
CGSM,made by a group of experiencedﬁshermen and scientists – either
working in scientiﬁc research on CGSM's ﬁshery or involved in its man-
agement – allowed us to build two ﬁshing impact indices for each ﬁsh-
erman: one based on experienced ﬁshermen's scores and other based
on scientists' scores.
A standard one-shot public goods experiment (PGE) and two time
preferences experiments (TPE) were run with the 152 ﬁshermen
whose ecological impact had been calculated by us. The ﬁrst TPE was
similar to the one conducted by Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) with the
only difference being that we used Coca Cola instead of chocolate pra-
lines, which were neither common nor available. The second TPE was
framed as a bonus for participating in the experiments. In this experi-
ment, we adapted the payoff table of Harrison et al. (2002) to the
context of Tasajera. Fishermen had to choose between ﬁve payoff alter-
natives, which had two future payment options. It allowed us to have a
measure ofﬁshermen's impatience through their propensity to discount
future payoffs, which provides a more precise measurement than a di-
chotomous choice. Additionally, the preference for the Coca Cola could
eventually be inﬂuenced by some “visceral factors” such as cravings,
hunger, among others (Frederick et al., 2002).2
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we introduce
Tasajera and an overview of the CGSM ﬁshery. In Section 3, we describe
theﬁeld data used in this study. In Section 4,we present our experimen-
tal design. In Section 5, we present the main results of this research
and relate them to those found in the other studies on external valid-
ity of experiments on cooperation in CPRs, and ﬁnally we offer some
conclusions.1 This is an entity of mixed character (i.e. public and private). It is responsible for doing
basic and applied research on the natural renewable resources in Colombia and the envi-
ronment of coastal and oceanic ecosystems.
2 According to Frederick et al. (2002) these visceral inﬂuences, which are linked to the
attractiveness of the good or activity, could affect the intertemporal choice of the subjects,
and can give rise to behaviors that look extremely impatient.2. Research Setting
Tasajera is made up of about 8000 inhabitants (SISBEN, 2012),
where the majority of its members live in conditions of extreme pover-
ty. Fishery resources fromCGSMare themain source of food and income
for this community. CGSM is an artisanal, multi-gear and multi-species
ﬁshery (Ibarra et al., 2014; INVEMAR, 2013), with around 3500 ﬁsher-
men (Blanco et al., 2007), of which an average of 950 are active daily
in the lagoon (INVEMAR-SIPEIN, 2012). Fishing in this lagoon is carried
out all year round and it is done exclusively by men.
CGSM is situated in the center of a bigger region (about 4900 km2)
known as Eco-region Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta,3 and it is one of
the most important in Colombia due to its large size (450 km2)
(Gónima et al., 1996), and its ecological and social value4 (Vilardy and
González, 2011). Given its importance, currently the protection of this
lagoon resides in several government agencies. However, de facto, it is
under an open-access regime since no State entity or organization nor
the community itself regulates the ﬁshery. The CGSM has seen strong
ﬂuctuations in the ﬁshing productivity over time, with some species at
risk of a critical reduction or collapse, as well as a critical deterioration
in the ﬁshermen's quality of life (Ibarra et al., 2014; INVEMAR, 2002).3. Field Data
The conservation and sustainable use of CGSM's ﬁshery resources
largely depends on the use of appropriate ﬁshing gear and methods. It
is also important to ﬁsh in sites distant from the key nursery areas and
the transit corridors of species. From our conversations with many of
Tasajera's ﬁshermen, we realized that they are aware of the negative
impacts that they might have on the ﬁshery resources by the actions
mentioned above. However, several studies have found that some of
the major commercial ﬁsh species of the CGSM are at risk of being
over-exploited, because they are caught below their average permitted
size (before they reach their sexual maturity), which is a result of ﬁsh-
ermen using nets with small mesh sizes (Ibarra et al., 2014; Ibarra
et al., 2013; Narváez et al., 2008; Rueda, 2007; Rueda and Defeo, 2003;
Rueda et al., 1997).
Based on this, and taking advantage of the fact that we had reliable
information that allowed us to evaluate the ﬁshermen's ﬁshing behav-
ior; we built ﬁshing impact indices for each ﬁsherman, which gave us
a measure of their cooperation for sustaining the ﬁshery resources of
CGSM over an extended time period (see Appendix A). Nevertheless,
as non-biologists, we did not know what type of ﬁsherman behavior
would be considered sustainable. Therefore, we asked ﬁshery biologists
working on the CGSM, ﬁrst in a qualitative and then in a standardized
way, how to classify what signiﬁes sustainable ﬁshing behavior. This
data provided us with information about what scientists understand
as being sustainable ﬁshing. However, there could be a strong misun-
derstanding about what signiﬁes sustainable behavior between the sci-
entists and the ﬁshermen, who are actually making the decisions. If
therewere a strong difference between the two opinions, then compar-
ing the experimental behavior with the scientiﬁc expert based indicator
would not provide reasonable results. The ﬁshermanwould base his de-
cisions onwhat he believes is sustainable. Therefore, we also asked ﬁsh-
ermen to classify the various gear, methods and spots. We abstained
from asking each individual ﬁsherman about his opinions on sustain-
ability, because he might have classiﬁed his own behavior as being sus-
tainable. We observed this trend when comparing ﬁshermen and3 This Eco-region includes 570 km2 of marine area and 730 km2 of an estuarine system
of coastal lagoons, connecting creeks and mangrove swamps.
4 The CGSMwas declared as Fauna and Flora Sanctuary in 1977. Likewise, it was desig-
nated as a Ramsar site in 1998 and Biosphere reserve in 2000. Furthermore, it is the main
source of both food and income for about 25,000 peoplewho live in seven small surround-
ing villages, including Tasajera (SISBEN, 2007).
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sources of data:
1. A database from SIPEIN (INVEMAR's Fisheries Information System).
It is a system of data collection and processing of ﬁshing information
for CGSM that belongs to INVEMAR. For our study, we used data from
2006 to 2010 regarding the ﬁshing spots, and characteristics of the
ﬁshing gear and methods used by ﬁshermen who later participated
in our experiments.
2. An evaluation of the ecological impact of ﬁshing activities in the
CGSM. For this evaluation, conducted in March 2013, we asked of
25 CGSM's experienced ﬁshermen and 25 scientists to grade the fol-
lowing aspects on an impact scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high):
a) The ecological impact caused by 13 ﬁshing gear/methods on
CGSM's main ﬁshery resources.5
b) The ecological impact of ﬁshing on 6 ﬁshing zones regularly visit-
ed by ﬁshermen.6
There is a general trend that scientists, in comparison with experi-
enced ﬁshermen, value any type of behavior as being less sustainable.
To evaluate whether the assessment made by experienced ﬁshermen
differed from the scientists, we compared the median scores of the six
ﬁshing zones and the thirteen types of ﬁshing gear/methods, by using
theWilcoxon Test for paired samples.We found that there is statistical-
ly signiﬁcant evidence (α= 0.01) that experienced ﬁshermen and sci-
entists differ in their opinions about all ﬁshing zones and about eight
out of thirteen ﬁshing gear types evaluated (see Fig. 1). However,
refraining from the magnitude, one can see in the radar graphs in
Fig. 1 that for many ﬁshing spots and gear there is a rather substantial
agreement on what is considered to be relatively sustainable or unsus-
tainable (as additional evidence see below the high correlation coefﬁ-
cients between the calculated indices with the help of the experienced
ﬁshermen on the one hand and experts weights on the other).
We calculated for each ﬁsherman two ﬁshing impact indices (one
based on experienced ﬁshermen's scores and another one based on sci-
entists' scores) with an identical range from (1 to 5). To build them, we
ﬁrst developed individual indicators for both ﬁshing spots and ﬁshing
gear/methods, and then we aggregated them to get the indices.7 Fig. 2
displays the distribution of these indices based on experienced
ﬁshermen's scores (Fig. 2a) and scientists' scores (Fig. 2b). Overall, the
indices based on the experienced ﬁshermen's points of view were be-
tween 1.24 and 2.56 (mean = 1.67, SD = 0.45), while the indices
based on scientists' opinion were between 2.49 and 3.82 (mean =
2.87, SD = 0.31). Both indices show a signiﬁcant degree of association
(Spearman r= 0.6594 p= 0.000). (Appendix A provides a detailed de-
scription of the development of the individual indicators and indices).
Given the ﬁshing characteristics of CGSM (multi-gear and multi-
species), the use of these indices as a measure of Tasajera ﬁshermen's
sustainability is more suitable than taking a single indicator as used by
Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011). First, the indices take into account all of
the ﬁshing gear and methods used by ﬁshermen, instead of using only
one ﬁshing instrument. This is particularly important in our case be-
cause ﬁshermen in Tasajera generally use more than one type of ﬁshing5 These ﬁshing gear represent seven of themost common gear used in the CGSM. How-
ever, for the evaluation, we deﬁned for some of the nets two different mesh sizes. The
speciﬁcations of ﬁshing gear/methods evaluated were: Cast net 1, 0.25″–2.25″; Cast net
2, 2.50″–3.00″; Seine net 1 (Chinchorra), 1.50″–2.50″; Seine net 2 (Chinchorra), 2.75″–
3.50″; Seine net 1 (Chinchorro), 0.75″–1.00″; Seine net 2 (Chinchorro), 1.01″–2.00″; Fixed
gill net 1, 1.25″–2.50″; Fixed gill net 2, 2.75″–4.00″; Encircling gill net 1 (Boliche), 1.25″–
2.50″; Encircling gill net 2 (Boliche), 2.75″–4.00″; Shrimp net, 0.50″–1.00″; Crab trapswith
entrance gap of 23 cm; Long lines with hook calibers 10 to 12.
6 These zones cluster 116 ﬁshing spots where ﬁshermen commonly ﬁsh. The zones
were deﬁned according to their ecological characteristics and importance.
7 The indices or composite indicators are a single index, which compiles individual indi-
cators. In addition, it maymeasuremultidimensional concepts that cannot be captured by
a single indicator (OECD and JRC, 2008).gear or method throughout the year, or jointly during a normal ﬁshing
day. Also, one particular gear might have been chosen due to many rea-
sons, for example, inheritance or current availability. Therefore, it might
not indicate the general sustainability orientation of a ﬁsherman. Exam-
ining themany choices a ﬁshermanmakeswill better reﬂect the general
trait of the individual, which is assumed to exist, similarly when analyz-
ing his experimental behavior.
Second, to build the ﬁshing impact indices we used real and reliable
data on daily ﬁshing habits of ﬁshermen for a long period of time. These
data included information about both ﬁshing spots visited, aswell as ﬁsh-
ing instruments used by ﬁshermen from 2006 to 2010. It enabled us to
consider not only those aspects related to the ﬁshery process (periods
of abundance or scarcity of the species, period of the year), but also
ﬁshermen's behavior according to their needs over time. For example, a
ﬁsherman may have a particularly high need at a certain moment in
time and therefore chooses a detrimentalmesh size or visits a particularly
high yielding spot, when otherwise he behaves more sustainably. Finally,
the third advantage of using the indices in comparison to a singlemeasure
is that they take into account not only the impact of ﬁshing instruments,
but also the impact ofﬁshing activities on certainﬁshing spots. This is very
important to the ecological sustainability of the CGSM. Thus, to go ﬁshing,
for instance, to nursery areas or transit corridors of species can reduce the
future yield, since in these areas the majority of the species are juveniles
or they are in transit to spawning in safer places.
In addition to the data used to build the ﬁshing impact indices, we got
individual information for the same group of ﬁshermen that participated
in the experiments through a survey conducted in February 2013. It
allowed us to get data on their socioeconomic characteristics and their
perception about the CGSM's ﬁshery resources and who should help in
the conservation of this lagoon. We use these variables as control vari-
ables in our models. Table 1 presents some summary statistics of these
variables. We chose these variables based on our knowledge about this
community, and some studies on artisanal ﬁshermen's behavior which
demonstrate the link between those variables and sustainable behavior
(Allison and Ellis, 2001; Cinner and McClanahan, 2006; Cinner and
Pollnac, 2004; Silva, 2006).With respect to these variables, it isworthnot-
ing that all of our participants in the experimentsweremen and full-time
ﬁshermen. On average, they have 31.5 years of experience as ﬁshermen,
work 12.7 h per day, and had 4.1 years of formal education.
4. The Experiments
4.1. Experimental Procedure
We conducted four laboratory sessions in a school of Tasajera during
theweekend of October 19 and 20 of 2013.We invited the 160 ﬁshermen
that we surveyed in February 2013,8 with 40 ﬁshermen for each session,
although, some of them did not show up. Ultimately, 152 ﬁshermen took
part in three experiments: one standard PGE and two TPEs, all ran in the
same session.We deliberately chose these standard experiments. We are
well aware that a one-shot public goods experiment does notmimic well
the cooperation environment of a dynamically evolving resource like a
ﬁsh stock (Janssen et al., 2010), nor are simple time preferences experi-
ments able to capture domain speciﬁc time preference rates (Krantz
andKunreuther, 2007). However,ﬁrst, those simple and unframed exper-
imentsmight bemost suitable for getting at fundamental individual char-
acteristics that underlie variation in cooperation and time preferences,
and which are not confounded with other factors such as learning effects
or context-speciﬁc behavior. Second, these experiments are frequently
used inways that assume relationships between game decisions and sus-
tainable behavior.8 We would like to point out that given we wanted to compare ﬁshermen's behavior in
real lifewith their decisions in the experiments,we invited only thoseﬁshermen forwhich
we had enough information in the SIPEIN database. Therefore, we could not make a ran-
dom selection of them and we have a ﬁshermen selection bias.
Fig. 1. Radar graphs for ﬁshing zones and ﬁshing gear/methods.
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ple each simultaneously in separate rooms. Instructions and order of the
experiments have been the same. At the beginning of the session, we
implemented the TPE with Coca Cola. Afterwards, ﬁshermen played
the PGE and ﬁnally, an additional TPE. We followed a simple design,
and we used clear visual instructions to facilitate ﬁshermen's under-
standing of the experiments, and the consequences of their decisions.
We conducted each experimental session in the same order, and we
assigned each ﬁsherman a code for both identifying him during the
session, and to ensure his anonymity. All the ﬁshermen's questions
were answered in public and communication among ﬁshermen during
the experimentswas not allowed.We provided the ﬁshermen a compli-
mentary snack and soft drink at the end of the session.4.2. Experimental Design
4.2.1. The Public Goods Experiment
We ran a PGEwith Tasajera's ﬁshermen.We assigned the participants
of each session randomly to groups of ﬁve persons. The participants did
not know to which group of ﬁve they belonged. We played the experi-
ment for one period, which allowed us to have a measure of their volun-
tary cooperation without the effects that might come from repeated
interaction or reputational concerns. The experiment was framed in ab-
stract and neutral terms as a transfer of money from a private account
to a group account. Each ﬁsherman received an endowment of 10 tokens,
and each token equaled 1,000 pesos (around US$ 0.50 then). Each ﬁsher-
man had to individually decide howmany out of 10 tokens he wanted to
Fig. 2. Distribution of the ﬁshing impact index.
9 A day's wage in this zone varied between 15,000–20,000 pesos (US$7.98–US$10.64)
at the time of the experiments.
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to transfer to the group account. Tokens in the group account were mul-
tiplied by the factor 1.5 and then equally distributed among the ﬁve
group members. Thus, if the ﬁve ﬁshermen in the group contributed
their 10 tokens to the group account each of them earned 15 points,
but if none of them contributed, each of them only earned 10 tokens.
The payoff function was:
∏i xi; xj
  ¼ 10−xið Þ þ 1:5 X j≠ix j þ xi
 n o
5
 
Where xi is individual i's contribution to the public good, and xj is the
sum total of the other four players' contributions. At the start of the ses-
sion, the experimenter read the instructions aloud and answered all the
ﬁshermen's questions in public (see instructions in Appendix B). Several
examples were explained. All questions of ﬁshermen were answered.
Then control questions were asked to the group, where ﬁshermen
could raise their hands for various options. If unanimitywas lacking fur-
ther explanations were provided. This process was repeated if neces-
sary. Afterwards, each ﬁsherman received two envelopes, one marked
as a private account, which contained his endowment (10 tokens),
and the other marked as a group account, which was empty. Fishermen
could transfer tokens from the private account to the group account.
Fishermen made their decisions in private in a special place built in
front of the classroom for this purpose.We did not inform theﬁshermenabout the identity and individual contribution decisions of their group
members. We paid each ﬁsherman his earnings in private and in
cash at the end of the session. Individual earnings ranged between
5,700 pesos and 18,900 pesos, with an average of 12,580 pesos (about
US$ 6.71).9
4.2.2. The Time Preferences Experiments
4.2.2.1. The Experimentwith the Coca Cola. To get ameasure of the level of
impatience of Tasajera's ﬁshermen, we ran the ﬁrst TPE with Coca Cola.
Nevertheless, we always made sure that enough plain water was avail-
able during the session. Thus, we reduced the risk that subjects ask for
the Coca Cola only because they were thirsty. Fishermen had to indicate
whether they preferred one Coca Cola before starting the experimental
session or two Coca Colas at the end of the session,when theywould re-
ceive their earnings from the PGE.
4.2.2.2. The Experiment with the Bonus (Discount Rates). Given the TPE
with Coca Cola only provides a very roughmeasurement of impatience,
we ran a more standard TPE. For that, we adapted the payoff table of
Harrison et al. (2002) to the context of Tasajera. Thus, in our case,
each ﬁsherman had to choose between payment option A and B for
each of the ﬁve payoff alternatives that we had deﬁned and then one
was randomly chosen for payment (see Table 2). The question that
we used to elicit individual discount rates was, do you prefer
10,000 pesos (around US$ 5) payable in one week or 10,000 pesos +
$X, payable in two weeks. In our experiment the $X varied from 0 to
10,000 pesos to reﬂect monthly interest rates from 0% to 400%, respec-
tively (see Table 2). We used these high interest rates because in pre-
tests we found out that those rates are appropriate ones to allow for
substantial variation.
We used two future payments in order to reduce the likelihood
that ﬁshermen perceive differences between the payments regard-
ing the transaction costs and the risk associated with future payment
(Harrison et al., 2002). In addition, we described the payment as a
bonus (show up fee) to participate in the experimental session (see
instructions in Appendix B), which would be paid in the next weeks di-
rectly in their houses by the experimenter.
To assure that the ﬁshermen understood the experiment, we ex-
plained it individually andwe read each of the payment alternatives, in-
stead of providing a payoff table. Once the experimenter was sure the
ﬁsherman had understood the experiment, he made his decision. The
ﬁrst author and three ﬁeld assistants collected ﬁshermen's decisions si-
multaneously using different classrooms to guarantee conﬁdentiality of
the ﬁshermen's decisions. We calculated the ﬁshermen's discount rates
by ﬁnding the point at which they switch from choosing the sooner to
the later payment.
5. Results and Discussion
In this section, we ﬁrst examine the correlation between the results
of the ﬁeld experiments and individual levels of exploitation of CGSM's
ﬁshery resources, measured through the indices. Then, we discuss our
ﬁndings in light of other studies that compare real life behavioral data
with experimental data. Similar to Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011), we
used the outcomes of the PGE and the two TPEs to predict ﬁshermen's
cooperativeness in maintaining the CGSM ﬁshery. Based on this, we hy-
pothesize (1) that ﬁshermen who contribute more in the PGE and
therefore show a higher level of cooperation while exerting a lower im-
pact on the CGSM (i.e., the value of their ﬁshing impact indices are low),
and (2) that ﬁshermen who are impatient in the TPEs (Coca Cola &
Bonus) have higher impacts on the CGSM (i.e., the value of their ﬁshing
impact indices are high).
Table 1
Summary of variables used in the estimations.
Variable name Explanation
Mean/
Prop SD N
Fishing impact index estimated with 
experienced fishermen’s opinion
1 (lowest impact) – 5 (highest impact) 1.67 0.45 152
Fishing impact index estimated with  
scientists’ opinion
1 (lowest impact) – 5 (highest impact) 2.87 0.31 152
Contribution in PGE (in tokens) 0 (lowest) -10 (highest) 4.93 3.14 152
Impatience (Coca Cola Dummy)
0 = prefers one Coca Cola immediately
1 = prefers two Coca Colas approximately 3 h later
0.73 152
Impatience (Bonus %)
Discount  rate calculated for each fisherman based 
on his decision in the experiment: 25%, 50%, 75%, 
100%, >100%
0.67 0.32 134
Years of schooling Number of years of formal education 4.10 3.96 152
People who fisherman supports
Number of people who depend economically on the 
fisherman in his home.
4.14 2.32 152
Fisherman shares in paying for 
household expenses (Dummy)
Other family members help fisherman with household 
expenses 
0 = fisherman  does not share in paying for  
household expenses
1 = fisherman  shares in paying for household 
expenses
0.41 152
Average daily hours fishing Average daily work time (Including time to sell) 12.72 2.85 152
Years in occupation Years fishing professionally 31.54 11.57 152
Fisherman is paying a loan (Dummy)
Fisherman is paying a loan
0 = fisherman  is not paying a loan
1 = fisherman  is paying a loan
0.33 152
Fisherman has job alternatives
(Dummy)
Fisherman has job alternatives
0 = fisherman  does not has job alternatives
1 = fisherman  has job alternatives
0.35 152
Fishery resources are scarce
(Dummy)
Perception about fishery resources 
0 = fishermen perceive there are many
resources for all.
1 = fishermen perceive resources have always
been scarce or they are beginning to become
scarce.
0.84 152
Government should help in the
conservation of CGSM (Dummy)
Perception about who should help in the conservation
of the lagoon
0 = fishermen believe they should help conserve
the CGSM      
1 = fishermen believe the government and other
users of the CGSM (different from the fishermen)
should help with the conservation of the lagoon.
0.45 152
SD = Standard deviation. N = Number of responses.
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According to our results, only a small group of ﬁshermen behaved
selﬁshly and did not contribute (9.2%), or contribute only one token
(4.6%) to the public good, while 21.7% contribute ﬁve tokens, and
34.2% contribute more than ﬁve tokens (see Fig. 3). These results con-
trast with shrimpers' contributions analyzed by Fehr and Leibbrandt
(2011) in Brazil. In their case, 15.8% of shrimpers did not contribute to
the public good, 11.4% contributed only one unit, 21.1% contributed
ﬁve units (tokens), and only 18.4% contributed more than ﬁve units.Table 2
Payoff table for the two-week time horizon.
Payoff
alternative
Payment option A
(1 week)
Payment option B
(2 weeks)
Weekly
interest rate
Monthly
interest rate
1 10,000 pesos 10,000 pesos 0% 0%
2 10,000 pesos 12,500 pesos 25% 100%
3 10,000 pesos 15,000 pesos 50% 200%
4 10,000 pesos 17,500 pesos 75% 300%
5 10,000 pesos 20,000 pesos 100% 400%Overall, the mean contribution to the group account was in our
PGE 4.93 tokens (SD = 3.14), while in the case of shrimpers it was
3.63 tokens (SD = 2.69). Comparing the contribution in our PGEFig. 3. Distribution of contributions in the Public Goods Experiment. Total ﬁshermen: 152.
Fig. 4. Contribution to the Public Goods Experiment (PGE) and Fishing Impact Indices. Level of contributions: Low=0–1 Tokens;Medium: 2–4 Tokens; High: 5–10 Tokens. Fishing impact
index: 1 = Low impact; 5 = High impact. Red bars represent the standard error of the mean (95% Conﬁdence interval).
10 We used the same categories by Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) to made the groups.
193L.E. Torres-Guevara, A. Schlüter / Ecological Economics 128 (2016) 187–201with other studies in comparable settings we observe similar levels
of contribution (Coleman and Lopez, 2013; Hill and Gurven, 2004;
Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa, 2014). This is remarkable, as in
Tasajera no form of collective action and cooperation takes place, at
least when it comes to the regulation and governance of ﬁsheries
(Torres-Guevara et al., 2016).
Fig. 4, shows the relationship between contributions to the PGE and
the average of the ﬁshing impact indices calculated based on the opin-
ion of experienced ﬁshermen (Fig. 4a) and scientists (Fig. 4b). As we
can see, independently of the index used, the relationship between
the indices and their contributions to the PGE is almost null. Likewise,if we grouped ﬁshermen according to their contributions to the public
good in low (0–1 token, N = 21), medium (2–4 tokens, N = 46) and
high level (5–10 tokens, N = 85),10 we obtain similar results (Fig. 4c).
Pearson correlation analysis between contributions in PGE (0,1,…,10)
and the indices conﬁrmed these results (ﬁshermen's opinion: r =
0.0128 p = 0.8758 and scientists' opinion: r =−0.0379 p = 0.6430).
We also investigated whether contributions in the PGE can predict
the level of impact that ﬁshermen cause on the ﬁshery resources of
Table 3
Determinants of ﬁshermen's ﬁshing behavior (OLS) based on experienced ﬁshermen's opinion.
Dependent variable Fishing impact index estimated with experienced fishermen’s opinion
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Contribution in PGE (in tokens) 0.0018 0.0000 0.0014 -0.0070
(0.0124) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0116)
Impatience (Coca Cola Dummy) 0.0728 0.1112 0.1121
(0.0843) (0.0735) (0.0735)
Impatience (Bonus %) -0.0788 -0.0915 -0.0824
(0.1197) (0.1115) (0.1151)
Years of schooling -0.0203 ** -0.0220 *** -0.0209 ** -0.0220 *** -0.0205 **
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0098) (0.0084) (0.0099)
People who fisherman supports -0.0124 -0.0132 -0.0094 -0.0131 -0.0100
(0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0164) (0.0145) (0.0165)
Fisherman shares in paying for household 
expenses (Dummy)
-0.2169 *** -0.2210 *** -0.2181 *** -0.2220 *** -0.2140 ***
(0.0678) (0.0667) (0.0732) (0.0678) (0.0738)
Average daily hours fishing -0.0555 *** -0.0576 *** -0.0499 *** -0.0575 *** -0.0506 ***
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0162) (0.0135) (0.0160)
Years in occupation 0.0012 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032)
Fisherman is paying a loan (Dummy) 0.1687 ** 0.1601 ** 0.1701 ** 0.1600 ** 0.1697 **
(0.0718) (0.0711) (0.0786) (0.0716) (0.0786)
Fisherman has job alternatives (Dummy) -0.0549 -0.0469 -0.0843 -0.0467 -0.0852
(0.0654) (0.0660) (0.0672) (0.0661) (0.0670)
Fishery resources are scarce (Dummy) -0.0219 -0.0278 -0.0535 -0.0278 -0.0535
(0.0845) (0.0848) (0.0901) (0.0851) (0.0909)
Government should help in the conservation 
of CGSM (Dummy)
0.2168 *** 0.2151 *** 0.1984 *** 0.2146 *** 0.2017 ***
(0.0646) (0.0641) (0.0694) (0.0643) (0.0690)
Constant 1.6627 *** 1.6182 *** 1.6964 *** 2.4447 *** 2.4295 *** 2.4620 *** 2.4214 *** 2.4959 ***
0.0679 0.0729 0.0934 (0.2141) (0.2144) (0.2876) (0.2115) (0.2768)
Observations 152 152 134 152 152 134 152 134
R2 0.0002 0.0051 0.0033 0.2926 0.3038 0.2548 0.3039 0.2572
Notes: *** 99% significance ** 95% significance  * 90% significance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
194 L.E. Torres-Guevara, A. Schlüter / Ecological Economics 128 (2016) 187–201CGSM, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. To analyze
these correlations we used the ﬁshing impact indices calculated
based on the experienced ﬁshermen's scores (Table 3) and scien-
tists' scores (Table 4) as dependent variables in the models. We
found that independent of the index, the contributions in the PGETable 4
Determinants of ﬁshermen's ﬁshing behavior (OLS) based on scientists' opinion.
Dependent variable Fishing
Models 1 2 3
Contribution in PGE (in tokens) -0.0037
(0.0073)
Impatience (Coca Cola Dummy) 0.0718
(0.0525)
Impatience (Bonus %) 0.0070
(0.0747)
Years of schooling 
People who fisherman supports
Fisherman shares in paying for household 
expenses (Dummy)
Average daily hours fishing
Years in occupation
Fisherman is paying a loan (Dummy)
Fisherman has job alternatives (Dummy)
Fishery resources are scarce 
Government should help in the conservation 
of CGSM (Dummy)
Constant
2.8832 *** 2.8118 *** 2.8402
(0.0480) (0.0428) (0.0537)
Observations 152 152 134
R2 0.0014 0.0105 0.0001
Notes: *** 99% significance ** 95% significance * 90% significance. Robust standard errors are in pfail to predict the level of impact that ﬁshermen exert on this eco-
system (Table 3, Model 1: t = 0.15, p = 0.883; Table 4, Model 1:
t = −0.51, p = 0.610). We tested if these results were robust to
the inclusion of several control variables such as years of schooling, num-
ber of people that ﬁsherman supports or average daily hours ﬁshing and impact index estimated with scientists' opinion
4 5 6 7 8
-0.0045 -0.0034 -0.0094
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0072)
0.0878 * 0.0856 *
(0.0490) (0.0495)
0.0272 0.0395
(0.0663) (0.0661)
-0.0103 ** -0.0118 ** -0.0107 ** -0.0116 ** -0.0101 *
(0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0055) (0.0048) (0.0055)
0.0128 0.0126 0.0188 0.0123 0.0181
(0.0113) (0.0109) (0.0120) (0.0110) (0.0121)
-0.1267 *** -0.1330 *** -0.1172 ** -0.1306 *** -0.1117 **
(0.0470) (0.0466) (0.0497) (0.0472) (0.0498)
-0.0354 *** -0.0367 *** -0.0340 *** -0.0369 *** -0.0350 ***
(0.0090) (0.0087) (0.0105) (0.0087) (0.0107)
0.0007 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0023)
0.0906 * 0.0837 0.0535 0.0840 0.0529
(0.0522) (0.0530) (0.0546) (0.0531) (0.0542)
-0.0816 * -0.0748 * -0.0845 * -0.0753 * -0.0857 *
(0.0451) (0.0450) (0.0471) (0.0448) (0.0466)
0.0721 0.0677 0.0436 0.0677 0.0437
(0.0542) (0.0543) (0.0541) (0.0543) (0.0543)
0.1704 *** 0.1674 *** 0.1252 *** 0.1687 *** 0.1296 ***
(0.0450) (0.0445) (0.0464) (0.0444) (0.0461)
*** 3.2162 *** 3.1790 *** 3.1768 *** 3.1984 *** 3.2223 ***
(0.1649) (0.1476) (0.1811) (0.1598) (0.1956)
152 152 134 152 134
0.2866 0.2994 0.2503 0.3005 0.2600
arentheses.
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Model 4: t =− 0.65, p = 0.515). In Models 7 and 8 in Tables 3 and 4,
we added the impatience measured by the TPE with Coca Cola (Models
7) and the TPEwith thebonus (Models 8) as other control variables. How-
ever, these do not affect the signiﬁcance of the contributions in the PGE.
Therefore, the results remain insigniﬁcant. We also tested if using an
index constructed on ﬁshing spots or ﬁshing gear/methods alone, or an
index using just data points from one year out of the SIPEIN data base
would provide any signiﬁcant correlation, but the results remained
insigniﬁcant.
Overall, in contrast to theﬁndings of Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011), we
did not ﬁnd evidence to conﬁrm our hypothesis that ﬁshermen who
contributed less to the public good exert higher impacts on the CGSM
and ﬁshermenwho contributemore have lower impacts on this lagoon.
One explanation of this lack of correspondence between the behavior in
the experiment and the real ﬁshing behavior of ﬁshermen is the use of
the index. Thus, while Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) used the hole size
of the shrimp traps, our index included several aspects of ﬁshing activ-
ity. In Section5.3,wherewediscuss our ﬁndings in light of other studies,
we analyze this aspect in more detail.
5.2. Predicting Fishermen's Sustainable Behavior with the Time Preferences
Experiments
As we mentioned earlier, we used two TPEs (Coca Cola & Bonus) to
get an individual measure of ﬁshermen's impatience. Fig. 5 displays
the ﬁshermen's preference for Coca Cola (Fig. 5a) and the distribution
of estimated discount rates (Fig. 5b). It can be seen that 74% of ﬁshermen
in our study were patient and preferred two Coca Colas at the end of the
session, which is similar to the ﬁndings of Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011)
who found that 61% of shrimpers were patient and preferred threeFig. 5. Fishermen's preferences in the experiments. Total ﬁshermen : 152 for the TPE with
Coca Cola (Fig. 5a). In the case of TPE with the bonus (Fig. 5b), the ﬁnal sample consists of
134 observations. 18 subjects gave inconsistent responses, so we did not include these
observations.pralines at the end of the experimental session. Fig. 5b shows, apart
from the results of the TPE with the bonus, also how many patient and
impatient people we found in the Coca Cola experiment for each catego-
ry in the TPE with the bonus. This indicates that there is not a clear rela-
tionship between the ﬁshermen behavior in both experiments.
Additionally we calculated Chi2, which indicates that there is a no signif-
icant relationship between the results of the Coca Cola experiment and
the TPE with bonus (Pearson Chi2 (4) = 4.7787 p = 0.311). From
those results we cannot infer which of the two TPEs provides a more re-
alistic representation of people's time preferences. However, the TPE
with bonus is the standard method of assessment of time preferences.
The Coca Cola experiment probably rather tests self control than time
preferences, as it is very similar to the Standford Marshmallow experi-
ment, where children have to choose if they prefer one Marshmallow
in comparison to two later (Mischel et al., 1972).
Fig. 6 shows a ﬁrst insight into the relationship between ﬁshermen's
impatience and the level of impact that they cause on the CGSM. As we
can observe in Fig. 6a, the average scores of indices from ﬁshermenwho
are impatient and prefer one Coca Cola immediately are similar to the
average scores of indices from ﬁshermen who are patient and prefer
two Coca Colas at the end of the experimental session. Fig. 6b shows
similar results: ﬁshermen with the lowest discount rates (i.e., patient
ﬁshermen) have almost the same average scores of indices than ﬁsher-
men who have the highest discount rates (i.e., impatient ﬁshermen).
We also used OLS regressions to analyze the relationship between
impatience and the scores of ﬁshing impact indices calculated based
on the experienced ﬁshermen's scores (Table 3) and scientists' scores
(Table 4). For the regressions, the variable Impatience (Coca Cola) wasFig. 6. Impatience and ﬁshing impact indices. Fishing impact index: 1 = Low impact, 5 =
High impact.
Table 5
Determinants of laboratory behavior (OLS).
Dependent variable Contibution to the public good 
Models 1 2 3 4
Impatience (Coca Cola Dummy) -0.6071 -0.6551
(0.6286) (0.6324)
Impatience (Bonus %) 1.3653 * 1.3015
(0.7963) (0.8177)
Years of schooling 0.0518 0.0619
(0.0668) (0.0825)
People who fisherman supports -0.0954 -0.0781
(0.0978) (0.1050)
Fisherman shares in paying for household expenses (Dummy) 0.7008 0.5832
(0.5380) (0.5690)
Average daily hours fishing -0.0496 -0.1017
(0.0937) (0.1047)
Years in occupation 0.0031 0.0006
(0.0246) (0.0276)
Fisherman is paying a loan (Dummy) 0.0869 -0.0637
(0.5441) (0.5671)
Fisherman has job alternatives (Dummy) -0.1532 -0.1276
(0.5533) (0.5840)
Fishery resources are scarce (Dummy) -0.0239 0.0081
(0.7944) (0.8366)
Government should help in the conservation of CGSM (Dummy) 0.3950 0.4666
(0.5211) (0.5551)
Constant 5.3750 *** 3.7966 *** 5.7058 *** 4.8296 **
(0.5624) (0.5786) (1.8028) (2.3262)
Observations 152 134 152 134
R2 0.0073 0.0197 0.0345 0.0487
Notes: *** 99% significance ** 95% significance * 90% significance. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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1 = Prefers two Coca Colas after). The variable Impatience (bonus) was
coded as a percentage, and corresponds to the discount rate calculated
for each ﬁsherman.
InModels 2 and 3 of Tables 3 and 4, we investigatedwhether the im-
patience in the TPE with Coca Cola (Models 2) and the TPE with the
bonus (Models 3) have any effect on the scores of the ﬁshing impact in-
dices. We found no effect of the impatience on the scores of the indices.
Nevertheless, when we added control variables, Models 5 and 6 in the
same Tables (3 and 4), we observe that there is a small signiﬁcant pos-
itive relationship (α= 0.10) between ﬁshermen who are patient and
prefer two Coca Colas after the session and the ﬁshing impact index cal-
culated based on scientists' opinion (Table 4, Model 5). Thus, ﬁshermen
who are patient have a higher ﬁshing impact index (coefﬁcient =
0.0878 points, t = 1.79, p = 0.075) than ﬁshermen who are impatient
and prefer one Coca Cola immediately. This result continues being sig-
niﬁcant (α= 0.10) and robust to the inclusion of the contributions in
the PGE as a control variable (coefﬁcient = 0.0856 points, t = 1.73,
p = 0.086) in the Model 7 of Table 4. This ﬁnding could be explained
by the disinvestment effect (Farzin, 1984). More patient ﬁshermen
have themeans to invest in ﬁshing gear with a higher extraction poten-
tial, which normally are more expensive and need savings. However,
due to their higher extraction rate, they are less sustainable. In Model
8 of Tables 3 and 4, which focuses on the TPE with bonus, where we
added the contribution to the PGE and other control variables, we still
ﬁnd no correlation between the level of impatience for the bonus and
the scores of the ﬁshing impact indices.11 The fact that we conducted
a number of independent analyses using relatively statistically uncorre-
lated predictors increases the likelihood of making a type I error, partic-
ularly using an α level of 0.10. All this indicates that the relationship
between the behavior in the various experiments and sustainable be-
havior in real life according to the index is rather weak.
In addition, we examined in Table 5, if the impatience in the TPE
with Coca Cola (Models 1 and 3) and the TPE with the bonus (Models11 We also investigated which of the socioeconomic and perception variables predicted
ﬁshermen's decisions in both TPEs. We observed that years in occupation and ﬁshery re-
sources are scarce were the only variables that signiﬁcantly (α= 0.05) predict decisions
in the experiments with Coca Cola and the bonus, respectively.2 and 4) predicts ﬁshermen's cooperativeness in the PGE. We found
that only in Model 2, the impatience of the TPE with bonus and without
using any controls leads to a signiﬁcant result (coefﬁcient = 1.3653
points, t = 1.71, p = 0.089). Nevertheless, when we added controls
(Model 4) it becomes insigniﬁcant, indicating the lack of robustness of
this result. Besides this model, the results for the other three Models
(1, 3 and 4) show that impatience is not a predictor of contributions
in the public good. Furthermore, as we played an unframed PGE, we
would have expected that the behavior in the PGE is only inﬂuenced
by the cooperative orientation of the players or their expectations
about the cooperativeness of the other group members and not by
time preferences.5.3. Discussing the Results in the Light of Other Studies
As stated in the introduction, only some studies have found evidence
of external validity of economic experiments, measured as the corre-
spondence between the behavior in the experiment and the behavior
in real life, while others have not. Table 6 shows a summary of the
main characteristics of these studies.
Regarding studies with external validity, Rustagi et al. (2010) com-
bined experimental measures of conditional cooperation and survey
measures on costly monitoring with forest growth data for 49 forest
user groups in Ethiopia. They found that groups with larger proportion
of conditional cooperation had more productive forests and they were
more likely to invest in forest patrols in order to promote cooperation
by sanctioning free riders. Carpenter and Seki (2011) examined two
groups of artisanal shrimpers in Japan, where one of the groups pooled
their income and operating costs and the other group did not. They
compared cooperation of poolers and non-poolers in a public goods ex-
periment with a voluntary contribution mechanism and payment to
show disapproval with the contribution of the other members of the
group. They found that poolers had higher levels of cooperation than
non-poolers.
Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) conducted laboratory experiments and
ﬁeld observations of shrimpers and ﬁshermen in Brazil. They found
that subjects who were more cooperative and patient in the experi-
ments were less likely to overexploit the CPR. Gelcich et al. (2013) in-
vestigated two groups of artisanal ﬁshermen in Chile, comparing
Table 6
Summary of main characteristics of the studies on external validity of experiments on cooperation in CPRs.
Hill & Gurven
(2004)
Gurven & Winking 
(2008)
Rustagi et al. 
(2010)
Carpenter and Seki 
(2011)
Fehr & Liebbrandt 
(2011)
Gelcich et al.
(2013)
Torres Guevara & 
Schlüter (2016)
Subjects Ache Indians: hunters 
and gathers 
Tsimane forager-
horticulturalists 
Forest users Artisanal shrimpers Artisanal shrimpers and 
fishers
Artisanal benthic fishers Artisanal fishermen
Place Forest areas of Eastern 
of Paraguay
Lowlands of Bolivia Bale region of Ethiopia Toyama Bay in the west 
coast of the Honsyou 
Island, Japan
Northeastern Brazil Coast of Chile Caribbean Coast of 
Colombia
Property regime Forest reservations with 
legal land access
Indigenous territory with
Collective 
property rights.
Secure tenure rights to 
use and manage the 
forests as a common 
property
Collective 
property rights through 
Fishery Cooperative 
Associations
Lake under
open access regime
Unionized fishers: 
Territorial user rights 
areas on the coast 
Non-unionized fishers: 
open access areas 
Coastal lagoon under a
de facto open access
regime
Type of analysis Individual behavior Individual behavior Group behavior: 
- 49 Forest user
groups
Group behavior:
- Poolers 
- Non-poolers
Individual behavior Group behavior:
- High performance
unions
- Low performance
unions
- Non-unionized fishers
Individual behavior
Experiments PGE
- Round 1: anonymous
- Round 2: public
- Framed as a play
money 
UG
- Round 1: anonymous
- Round 2: public
DG
- One-shot
UG
- One-shot
TPPG
- One-shot
PGE
- One-shot with
conditional 
cooperation
- No frame
PGE - VCM
- Rounds 1 to 5: VCM
- Round 6-10: VCM +
Social disapproval
- Framed as a fishery
situation
PGE
- One-shot
- No Frame
TP E
- Chocolate bonbons
CPRE
- 20 rounds
- Framed as a fishery
situation
PGE
- One-shot
- No Frame
TP E1
- Coca Cola
TP E2
- Discount rates
- Framed as a bonus to
participate
Real life indicator - Observations of food
production and 
sharing patterns
- Observations of
prosocial behavior in
everyday life: well labor 
contribution, time spent 
in social visitation and 
social group size, food 
sharing, beer provision 
and consumption and 
contribution to a village 
fest
- Survey measures on
costly monitoring
- Number of young
trees per hectare
- Fishing productivity - Size of holes of
shrimp traps 
- Membership of a
fishers’ union 
- Union’s performance
in comanagement: 
high and low. 
- Co-management
performance index: 
indirect measure of 
cooperation.
- Fishing impact indices
Evidence of 
external validity No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
PGE: Public Goods Experiment / UG: Ultimatum game / DG: Dictator game / TPPG: Third Party Punishment Game / TPE: Time Preferences Experiment / PGE-VCM: Public Goods Experiment with Voluntary 
Contribution Mechanism / CPRE: Common Pool Resources Experiment
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ﬁshermenwith their behavior in the experiments. They found that ﬁsh-
ermen of high-performance unions were more cooperative among
them, while ﬁshermen of low-performance unions were less coopera-
tive. Likewise, they found that ﬁshermen that were not unionized did
no cooperate at all.
The two studies that did not ﬁnd evidence of external validity
were carried out with indigenous communities in South America.
One of them was done by Hill and Gurven (2004). They related mea-
sures of real life cooperativeness with experimental measures of the
Ache Indians, a tribal group that lives in the forested areas of
Paraguay and has a well-known tradition of extensive food sharing,
as well as high levels of cooperative food acquisition. Nevertheless,
there was no correlation between subjects' behavior in the experi-
ments and their behavior in real life. The second study was devel-
oped by Gurven and Winking (2008). They studied the Tsimane, an
indigenous group of forager-horticulturalists of lowland Bolivia.
They compared the subjects' behavior in various experiments with
their prosocial behavior in their daily life. They found that there
was no correlation between their real-life forms of cooperation and
their levels of contribution in the experiments.
There are two main reasons that in our opinion, might explain why
some studies have found a relationship between subject's behavior in
the experiments on cooperation in CPRs and their actions in real life,
and other studies did not. The ﬁrst reason is related to the experimental
setup. As shown in Table 6, two of the studies with evidence of external
validity (Carpenter and Seki, 2011; Gelcich et al., 2013) compared the
behavior between groups of resource users, not of individuals. In these
experiments, cooperators and non-cooperators played the game sepa-
rately. Therefore, there was a clear signaling to all participants about
the cooperativeness of their fellow players. In addition, ﬁshermen
have been associated in cooperatives for several years, which have
allowed them to establish not only patterns of understanding, but also
to develop a group identity. In the case of Rustagi et al. (2010), the ex-
perimentswere donewith subjects that are part of a participatory forest
management program and have been organized in small forest usergroups since 2000, which have formal rights to manage their forests
blocks as commons. Therefore, they know more or less what to expect
from their group members. This should have inﬂuenced subjects' deci-
sions in the experiment, in particular to the conditional cooperators
within the groups.
In contrast, Hill andGurven (2004) andGurven andWinking (2008) –
who did not ﬁnd evidence of external validity – compared the contribu-
tions of each individual, and cooperators and non-cooperators played
the game together. Therefore, conditional cooperators could not antici-
pate either high or low contribution levels, due to group composition
and previous experience with those group members. In our experiment,
cooperators and non-cooperators played together, similar to Hill and
Gurven (2004).
The second reason is the indicator that is used to measure coopera-
tion in real life. Carpenter and Seki (2011) use people's preferences to
solve problems collectively or individually as a real life indicator. Thus,
according to these authors, ﬁshermen established the pooling arrange-
ment since 1960 as response to several economic problems that they
were facing in that moment. Gelcich et al. (2013) take as a proxy if peo-
ple are living in a cooperative or non-cooperative environment. Thus,
one groupwas formed by subjects fromﬁshermen's unionswith territo-
rial user rights areas and a comanagement system since 1997. The other
group was formed by nonunionized ﬁshermen who ﬁshed exclusively
in open-access areas, and they did not participate in the comanagement
system. Both studiesﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship, namely, both real life
measurements assess cooperation behavior directly.
The studies of Rustagi et al. (2010); Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011),
and our study instead observed sustainable resource use as an indi-
cator of cooperation. Nevertheless, we must stress that while these
studies use only one feature as a measure of sustainability and asso-
ciated it with cooperation, we use an index that includes several
components related to the ﬁshing activity for ﬁve years. In fact,
Rustagi et al. (2010) use the number of young trees per hectare
that each group had in their forest blocks in 2005. The data was ob-
tained from an assessment that is carried out once every ﬁve years
by the forest administration.
12 The information about the evaluation and the construction of the indices is nearly the
same as the one provided in Torres-Guevara et al. (Under review) in Sustainability. Under-
standing artisanal ﬁshermen's behavior: the case of Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta,
Colombia.
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an indicator of cooperation, which are manufactured by the ﬁshermen
making holes in used PET bottles. To get the data, they measured ﬁve
to ten holes in one to two bottles that ﬁshermen brought to a meeting
in which they participated, and then they estimated an average hole
size for each ﬁsherman. Nevertheless, this measure of cooperativeness
could be biased not only due to the reduced number of hole sizes mea-
sured – as these authors state – but also because ﬁshermen could have
inherited the traps from somebody, or asked someone else to make the
holes in thebottles, or brought the only available bottles that they had in
that moment to the meetings. In our case, we built two ﬁshing impact
indices, which evaluate ﬁshermen's ﬁshing behavior for ﬁve years
based on the different ﬁshing gear and methods used, and the ﬁshing
spots visited.
In contrast, Hill and Gurven (2004) use data about the food produc-
tion and sharing patterns for ﬁve months, and Gurven and Winking
(2008) use food production, food-sharing patterns, social visitation,
and participation in some communal activities carried out for the com-
munity for elevenmonths. Overall, all those indicators are inﬂuenced by
many factors (as our regression results show) and cooperative behavior
as a trait might be just one of them. System knowledge, environmental
awareness, income, or sense of responsibility deﬁnitelymight also inﬂu-
ence sustainable behavior. In fact, for instance, some studies have found
that artisanal ﬁshermen who are older, with higher levels of education,
and higher asset wealth are less likely to use destructive ﬁshing gear
(Cinner, 2010; Silva, 2006). Therefore, it is not wholly surprising that
the relationship between experimental behavior and sustainable be-
havior in real life is not as strong as if we measure cooperation in real
life more directly.
6. Conclusions
In this study, we did a similar study to that of Fehr and Leibbrandt
(2011) in Tasajera, a ﬁshing community located in the Caribbean
Coast of Colombia. In addition, we ran a standard TPE following a “mul-
tiple price list” format, similar to that of Harrison et al. (2002). We ran a
one-shot PGE and two TPEs with 152 ﬁshermen that exploit the ﬁshery
resources of the CGSM. The most important ﬁndings of our study are as
follows: First, we ﬁnd no correlation between the ﬁshermen's contribu-
tions in the PGE and the ﬁshing impact indices. This ﬁnding contrasts
with the results of Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011), who showed that
shrimpers who contribute more to the public good use shrimp traps
with bigger holes, allowing the small and infertile shrimps to escape.
Nevertheless, we also ﬁnd that a large group of ﬁshermen contribute
to the PGE.
Second, the evidence about the effect of the impatience on the ﬁsh-
ing impact indices is weak. Onlywhenwe use the ﬁshing impact indices
estimated based on scientists' scores, the TPE with Coca Cola is positive
and signiﬁcant, which suggests that patient ﬁshermen have higher im-
pacts on the CGSM. We cannot conclude that there is a relationship be-
tween ﬁshermen's behavior in their real life and their behavior in the
experiments. Our results are different to the ﬁndings of Fehr and
Leibbrandt (2011), who found a strong correlation between shrimpers'
impatience (measured by preferences for pralines) and the size of the
holes in their shrimp traps.
In our view, the fact that some studies ﬁnd evidence of external va-
lidity of economic experiments and others do not, might be associated
to diverse factors such as the context in which ﬁshermen live, or the
way in which the cooperation in real life is measured. Thus, based on
the ﬁndings of these studies, we can state that there is a strong link be-
tween cooperation in real life and ﬁeld experiments if real lifemeasures
are closely linked to cooperative behavior (Carpenter and Seki, 2011;
Gelcich et al., 2013). In the case of a real lifemeasure that is only partial-
ly showing cooperative behavior, the link might be much weaker. Food
sharing (Gurven and Winking, 2008; Hill and Gurven, 2004), might be
inﬂuenced, for example, by cooking abilities or income. Sustainablebehavior (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Rustagi et al., 2010), for example,
might not only be inﬂuenced by cooperative behavior, but also by time
preferences, environmental awareness, resource dependence, among
others. If cooperation and impatience increase sustainable behavior, it
is very much context dependent, and the relationship might even be
the other way around. Therefore, the observation of a rather low rela-
tionship between the experimental behavior in a PGE, the TPEs and sus-
tainable behavior in real life might not put into question the external
validity of experiments as such. However, the ﬁndings imply that we
should be more careful, when linking experimental behavior in those
standard experiments with overall sustainable behavior. As certain
studies show, experimental behavior might correspond well to cooper-
ation levels or time preferences in real life, but not to themore complex
phenomenon of sustainable behavior. This indicates that caution is nec-
essary, if we are to draw policy conclusions on sustainable behavior
from experimental results.
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Appendix A. Fishing Impact Indices
A.1. Methodology to Build the Indices Evaluating Fishing Ecological Impact
in Cienaga Grande de Santa Marta (CGSM)12
To build the ﬁshing impact indices we used two sources of data:
1. A database with individual data on ﬁshing spots visited and ﬁshing
gear/methods used from 2006 to 2010 for the same group of ﬁsher-
men that participated in the experiments. We got this data from
SIPEIN (INVEMAR's Fisheries Information System).
2. An evaluation of the ecological impact of ﬁshing in CGSMmade by 25
experienced CGSM's ﬁshermen and 25 scientists with an in-depth
knowledge of CGSM ﬁshery.
SIPEIN is a system of data collection and processing of ﬁshing infor-
mation that belongs to the Institute for Marine and Coastal Research –
16 The ﬁrst author has been working with CGSM's ﬁshermen since 2011; therefore, she
had identiﬁed previously this group of ﬁshermen. It is important to note that some of
199L.E. Torres-Guevara, A. Schlüter / Ecological Economics 128 (2016) 187–201INVEMAR. It is the institute responsible in Colombia for conducting
basic and applied research on the natural renewable resources and the
environment of coastal and oceanic ecosystems. This Institute has
been collecting ﬁshing information on the CGSM since 1993. The data
are collected ﬁve days a week in ﬁve ﬁsh landing sites where sell their
ﬁsh. At each site, the information is collected by a resident trained by
INVEMAR for this job. The ﬁshermen to be assessed are selected unsys-
tematically, depending on availability. In three out of ﬁve days, informa-
tionon theﬁshingunit (vessel and crew) andﬁshing effort,ﬁshing spots
visited, characteristics of theﬁshing gear andmethods, and landed catch
is gathered. In the other two days, they collect data on the size frequen-
cy for the landed catch, ﬁsh prices, and ﬁshing expenses, among other
data. Due to this way of data collection, there is not a daily monitoring
of each ﬁsherman registered in SIPEIN and therefore each ﬁsherman
had different number of data entries for the period evaluated. For this
study we only used the data on the ﬁshing spots visited and the ﬁshing
gear and methods used by ﬁshermen sampled from 2006 to 2010.
The evaluation of ecological impact of ﬁshing in CGSM consisted of
four stages. In the ﬁrst stage, we elaborated a list of all ﬁshing spots
and gear (with their respective methods) registered in SIPEIN database.
In total we identiﬁed 116 ﬁshing spots where ﬁshermen ﬁsh.
Additionally, we found seven different gear, namely, ﬁve types of nets,
long lines, and crab traps. One of the nets, the gill net, is used with
twomethods—encircling and ﬁxed—thus we established eight different
ﬁshing methods. For the nets, we identiﬁed 36 different mesh sizes.
In stage two, we deﬁned six ﬁshing zones within CGSM according to
their ecological characteristics and importance with support of a few
scholars with an in-depth knowledge of the region, namely, protected
areas, natural nursery areas, mouths of rivers and streams, mangrove
roots and other vegetation, Boca de la Barra, and water mirrors away
from the mangrove. Then, with the help of the scholars and several ex-
perienced ﬁshermen, we classiﬁed all 116 ﬁshing spots identiﬁed in
stage one into one of these six zones.
Afterward, with support of the scholars in addition to ﬁshing litera-
ture (Bjordal, 2009; Blaber et al., 2000; Rueda and Defeo, 2003), we
chose three criteria normally used to evaluate the ecological impact of
ﬁshing gear/methods on the ecosystem, namely, impact on the habitat,
efﬁciency,13 and selectivity14 of ﬁshing gear and target species impact.
To reduce thenumber of ﬁshingnets to be evaluated, based on literature
(INVEMAR, 2002; López et al., 2001; Narváez et al., 2008; Rueda and
Defeo, 2003; Santos-Martínez et al., 1998) and scholars' knowledge,
we deﬁned two groups of mesh sizes for each method: ecologically un-
sustainable (nets with the smaller mesh size) and ecologically sustain-
able (nets with the larger mesh size). For the shrimp nets, we deﬁned
only one group since shrimps inside CGSM are juveniles and therefore
it is unsustainable to catch them (López et al., 2001). Additionally, for
each ﬁshing gear, we evaluated jointly two aspects (1) ﬁshing method
and (2) the dimension of the ﬁshing gear. For the latter we evaluated
the mesh size of the nets, the caliber of hooks for the long lines, and
the size of the entrance gap for the crab traps.
Due to the diversity of ﬁshing resources in CGSM, we considered
only the main ﬁshing resources extracted for the evaluation. Thus, in
the third stage, we selected ﬁve types of ﬁsh and three invertebrates15
based on CGSM's ﬁshing reports (Cadavid et al., 2012; INVEMAR,
2012) and scientists' knowledge.
Using the information gleaned in the preceding three stages, we cre-
ated two questionnaires that would allow us to collect experienced
ﬁshermen's and scientists' opinions on the ecological impact of ﬁshing13 Gear efﬁciency or catchability refers to “ﬁsh caught per ﬁsh available per effort unit
and per time unit” (Jul Larsen et al., 2003).
14 Gear selectivity refers to a “ﬁshingmethod's ability to target and capture organisms by
size and species during the ﬁshing operation allowing non-targets to be avoided or re-
leased unharmed” (FAO, 2005).
15 The CGSM ﬁshery is multi-species; we did not evaluate the impact of the ﬁshing on
each species in particular. Instead, we asked ﬁshermen and scientists who participated
in the evaluation to consider all the species jointly.on CGSM's main ﬁshery resources and its habitat. These questionnaires
included questions for each of the ﬁshing zones as well as questions re-
garding the different ﬁshing gear and methods identiﬁed earlier. The
ﬁrst author conducted workshops and interviews with experienced
ﬁshermen and scientists in Tasajera and Santa Marta in March 2013.
She collected data from 25 experienced ﬁshermen16 and 25 scientists,17
both groups selected using convenience and snowball sampling. Both
experienced ﬁshermen and scientists graded on a scale from 1 to 5,
where 1 meant low impact and 5 meant high impact, (a) ecological im-
pact of ﬁshing in each ﬁshing spot (graded by ﬁshermen) or zone iden-
tiﬁed previously (graded by scientists), and (b) ecological impact
caused by the ﬁshing gear/methods on CGSM's main ﬁshery resources
deﬁned previously. The ﬁrst difference we identiﬁed between ﬁsher-
men and scientists is that ﬁshermen had a much more nuanced under-
standing of the area and thus were able to evaluate the 116 ﬁshing
spots. Scientists had to evaluate only the six ﬁshing zones in which
the 116 spots were clustered.
Based on the results of the evaluation done by experienced ﬁsher-
men and scientists, we ﬁrst built individual indicators for ﬁshing spots
and ﬁshing gear/methods and then composite indicators (Indices).
To build the individual indicators based on scientists' opinion, ﬁrstly,
we computed a simple average with the scores the scientists provided
for each ﬁshing zone (6). Then we repeated the same procedure for
each ﬁshing gear/method evaluated (13). To build the individual in-
dicators based on experienced ﬁshermen's opinion, we repeated the
same process with their scores. Secondly, we evaluated the individ-
ual ﬁshermen's behavior. To do that, we merged the information
about the ﬁshing spots visited and the ﬁshing gear/methods used
by ﬁshermen from 2006 to 2010 with the average scores obtained
from scientists' or experienced ﬁshermen assessment. Thirdly, since
each ﬁsherman had different amounts of data entries for the whole pe-
riod analyzed, we computed average scores (individual indicators) for
each ﬁsherman and for four different issues: two relating to ﬁshing
spots — one based on experienced ﬁshermen's scores and the other
based on scientists scores — and two for ﬁshing gear/methods — one
based on experienced ﬁshermen's scores and the other one based on
scientists scores.
To build the composite indicators (indices), we ﬁrst assigned to each
individual indicator (ﬁshing spot and ﬁshing gear/method) a weight
using the equal weighing method (OECD and JRC, 2008).18 Then we
aggregated them using the linear aggregation method (OECD and JRC,
2008).19 We got two composite indicators for each ﬁsherman, one
based on experienced ﬁshermen's opinions and the other based on
scientists' opinions.
Appendix B. Supplementary Data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.04.022.
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